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The United Nations has recognized the devastating consequences of “unpredictable, unpreventable and impersonal”
disasters—at least US $2 trillion in economic damage and more than 1.3 million lives lost from natural disasters in the
last two decades alone. In many disasters (both natural and man-made) hundreds—and in major earthquakes,
thousands—of lives are lost in the first days following the event because of the lack of medical/surgical facilities
to treat those with potentially survivable injuries. Disasters disrupt and destroy not only medical facilities in the
disaster zone but also infrastructure (roads, airports, electricity) and potentially local healthcare personnel as well.
To minimize morbidity and mortality from disasters, medical treatment must begin immediately, within minutes
ideally, but certainly within 24 h (not the days to weeks currently seen in medical response to disasters). This requires
that all resources—medical equipment and support, and healthcare personnel—be portable and readily available;
transport to the disaster site will usually require helicopters, as military medical response teams in developed countries
have demonstrated. Some of the resources available and in development for immediate medical response for
disasters—from portable CT scanners to telesurgical capabilities—are described. For immediate deployment,
these resources—medical equipment and personnel—must be ready for deployment on a moment’s notice and
not require administrative approvals or bureaucratic authorizations from numerous national and international
agencies, as is presently the case. Following the “trauma center/stroke center” model, disaster response incorporating
“disaster response centers” would be seamlessly integrated into the ongoing daily healthcare delivery systems
worldwide, from medical education and specialty training (resident/registrar) to acute and subacute intensive care
to long-term rehabilitation. The benefits of such a global disaster response network extend far beyond the lives
saved: universal standards for medical education and healthcare delivery, as well as the global development of
medical equipment and infrastructure, would follow. Capitalizing on the humanitarian nature of disaster response—
with its suspension of the cultural, socioeconomic and political barriers that often paralyze international cooperation
and development—disaster response can be predictable, loss of life can be preventable and benefits can be both
personal and societal.
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Introduction
Problems with current disaster response
Disasters—largely unpredictable, unpreventable and im-
personal—take a devastating toll around the world. Since
the start of the new millennium, earthquakes alone have
claimed upwards of 300,000 lives in each of 2 years
(2004 and 2010) and upwards of 100,000 lives in each of
2 more years (2005 and 2008). Cyclones/hurricanes/
typhoons claimed upwards of 150,000 lives in 2008, the
majority due to Cyclone Nargis, which struck Myanmar
(Burma) with approximately 140,000 lives lost [1,2].
The impact of natural disasters is substantial, in terms
of both economic losses as well as lives lost. The trends
for both economic losses and loss of life for the period
1956 through 2005 are graphed by decade in Figure 1.
Hydrometeorological causes (notably cyclones/hurricanes/
typhoons) have inflicted increasing economic losses
(approaching 500 billion USD for the decade 1996–2005),
while geological causes (notably earthquakes) have caused
increasing numbers of deaths (well over 500,000 for the
decade 1996–2005) [3].
The United Nations (UN) has recognized the impact of
natural disasters worldwide. In the two decades following
the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, it has been
estimated that the damages incurred totaled US $2 tril-
lion and that the number of lives lost was greater than
1.3 million [4]. Following the Indian Ocean earthquake
and tsunami that killed upwards of 300,000 people in
2004, the UN World Conference on Disaster Reduction
(January, 2005, Kobe, Japan) noted the following [5]:
“We have the knowledge for disaster reduction, what
we need is the action. The most important conditionFigure 1 Economic losses and loss of life from hydrometeorological andfor disaster reduction is the political commitment to
remove the institutional barriers and integrate disaster
risk reduction in the strategies and programmes for
sustainable development…”
“We recognize…the importance of involving all
stakeholders, including governments, regional and
international organizations and financial institutions,
civil society, including non-governmental organizations
and volunteers, the private sector and the scientific
community” [5].
One way to reduce the number of deaths in disasters
is to get the medical/surgical “boots on the ground” at a
disaster site before the injured have died of potentially
survivable injuries. The most dramatic example in recent
disasters is the Haiti earthquake of 2010. The Executive
Director of Partners for Health, Ophelia Dahl, estimated
that upwards of 20,000 people with survivable injuries
died every day the first week following the Haiti earth-
quake because there were no surgical facilities available
(to treat fractures, blunt and penetrating trauma, head
injuries, etc.) [6]. It is informative that the first and only
such international medical response team with surgical
capabilities to arrive in Port-au-Prince within 24 h was
the Icelandic Association for Search and Rescue, a group
always ready for immediate deployment [7].
Why has disaster response been so ineffective in saving
those victims with survivable injuries? Some reasons are
the following:
1. Disasters typically are relatively rare occurrences in
any specific location. Unlike the medical problems
addressed by the healthcare system on a day-to-day
basis—from chronic diseases such as diabetes, obesitygeological disasters by decade (from reference [3] with permission).
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motor vehicle injuries and strokes—unless one lives
in an earthquake-prone area (e.g. Japan, Chile) or a
cyclone/hurricane/typhoon-prone area (e.g. the
Caribbean, the Western Pacific), one is unlikely to
experience a major disaster on more than a very
occasional basis. Healthcare resources are likely to
be spent on more frequent (if relatively benign)
events such as the common cold, urinary tract
infections and pneumonia than on very rare (but
usually fatal) events such as Jacob-Creutzfeldt
disease, cardiac arrest and the Ebola virus (apart
from episodes like the current Ebola crisis).
2. Disasters are usually unpredictable. It is difficult to
commit resources to an adverse event that occurs
rarely and (given our lack of understanding of the
aetiology) seemingly randomly. In the traditional
healthcare system, there is, for example, more “bang
for the buck” in maternal prenatal care than in
screening the population for potential sudden
cardiac arrest.
3. Disasters by their very nature evoke a humanitarian
response. This falls outside the typical definition of a
government’s responsibility to its citizens (security,
education, basic health care etc.). Because disasters
are unpredictable and unpreventable, they fall
“between the cracks” of traditional government
agencies. The responsibility for disaster response is
often delegated—perhaps “relegated” is more
accurate—to religious and/or non-governmental
groups (e.g. the Red Cross and Red Crescent,
Médecins Sans Frontières).
4. Finally—but likely most importantly—disaster
response as currently configured requires the
coordination of various government agencies in
order to be implemented. The time required for
administrative approvals to initiate a disaster
response when multiple agencies are involved is
incompatible with saving the lives of those who have
suffered survivable injuries but who require prompt
(i.e. within hours, not days or weeks) medical care.
International organizations such as the UN and the
World Health Organization (WHO) not only have docu-
mented the high cost of disasters—both in economic
terms and in lives lost, as noted above—but also have
created a multitude of agencies to react to disasters.
The United Nations Strategy for Disaster Reduction
(UNISDR)—just one of several UN agencies charged
with disaster response—has a considerable bureaucracy
as evidenced in Figure 2 [8].
The WHO timeline for disaster response, which consists
of 23 performance standards, highlights the problem
with the current procedures for disaster response. It isnot until day 3 (performance standard 7) that “the ar-
rival in-country of a team of experienced professionals”
is expected. Moreover, the WHO performance standards
are concerned almost exclusively with administrative not
medical issues and the timely production of reports rather
than the timely saving of lives [9].
An example of administrative bureaucracy paralyzing
disaster response comes from Japan (which likely has one
of the most robust disaster response programs). In early
2011—before the Fukushima earthquake and tsunami—the
Japanese Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) had created what
was essentially a three-bed mobile intensive care unit (the
Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron—AMES), specifically
for events such as the Fukushima disaster. Ironically, be-
tween April 2011 and April 2014, the AMES unit was used
on only ten occasions. All of these ten missions involved
the transport of a single patient (not the three patients the
AMES is capable of transporting), none of whom was a
disaster victim: the diagnoses ranged from hepatorenal
failure to acute cardiac conditions. The reasons cited by
members of the JASDF for the failure to use the AMES in
disaster response included the following [10]:
1. The prefecture government’s “name recognition” of
the AMES availability for disaster response was low.
2. The prefecture government was unable to notify
JASDF of the need for the AMES in a timely manner.
3. The need for the JASDF to provide supplies to the
disaster site was a higher priority than the use of the
AMES for transport of critically injured patients.
Another organization that has provided extensive disas-
ter response in the Asia-Pacific region is the Australian
Defense Force Air Medical Evacuation group (ADF AME).
Based on over a decade of disaster response missions, the
ADF AME suggested the following improvements are
needed [11]:
1. A “short notice to move” structure is needed, i.e.
rather than responding to each disaster with a
“mission”, the AME needs to have an ongoing
system in place for immediate deployment.
2. The ADF should be integrated seamlessly with
civilian resources for disaster response.
3. Multinational forums and agreements are needed to
bring about regional integration of the disaster
response teams amongst the various countries in the
Asia-Pacific region.
Disaster response—the good, the bad and the opportunity
On August 4, 2010—less than 6 months after the devas-
tating earthquake and tsunami that struck south-central
Chile—a man-made disaster struck northern Chile: the
Copiapó mining accident. Thirty-three miners were trapped
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mine. Seventeen days after the accident, it was discovered
that the 33 miners were in fact alive in an underground
shelter. The Chilean government’s response included
the rapid mobilization of the following resources: virtually
every Chilean government ministry, three international
drilling rig teams and more than a dozen multinational
corporations, as well as the US National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA). On October 13,
2010—more than 2 months after the accident—this global
rescue effort safely rescued all 33 miners [12].
The comparison of the loss of life from recent cyclones/
typhoons in south and southeast Asia is also informative
(Table 1). With cyclones/hurricanes/typhoons and simi-
lar meteorological disasters, there is—fortunately—more
advanced warning than with geological disasters such as
earthquakes and volcano eruptions. In Cyclone Nargis,nearly 140,000 lives were lost; in Typhoon Haiyan 7,000;
and in Cyclone Phailin, less than 50.
What can account for the very high loss of life in Cyclone
Nargis and the very low loss of life in Cyclone Phailin?
Likely factors in Cyclone Nargis were the failure of the
government to provide adequate warning and evacuation of
those living in the Irrawaddy Delta, as well as the govern-
ment’s failure in the early days following Cyclone Nargis to
allow international assistance to participate in the disaster
response. In Cyclone Phailin, likely the primary reason for
relatively little loss of life was the establishment in the
Indian state of Odisha of 31 telemedicine stations that very
effectively coordinated a heroic evacuation effort: upwards
of 1.3 million people were moved to 600 storm shelters.
The system for disaster response was already in place
and not dependent on the approvals and coordination
of various agencies for the response to be implemented.
Table 1 Comparison of recent cyclones/typhoons in South
and Southeast Asia




Nargis Myanmar April 2008 215 ~140,000
Phailin India October 2013 260 <50
Haiyan Philippines November 2013 315 ~7,000
Estimated deaths from three recent cyclones/typhoons (from references
[13-15] with permission).
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can be reduced dramatically by effective planning and
immediate initiation of the disaster response—as dem-
onstrated by the governments of Chile and India in the
examples above. The fact that disasters do not respect
the borders between countries, the political differences
between governments and the socioeconomic, cultural
and religious differences amongst people make disaster
response a unique opportunity to improve health care
beyond merely reducing the morbidity and mortality of
disasters. The need to respond immediately to a disaster
eliminates the time for consideration of reasons why one
should not do what is right from a humanitarian and
moral aspect.
Disaster response—Requirements, resources and techniques
Whether natural (e.g. earthquakes, typhoons and tsunamis)
or man-made such as terrorist events (e.g. bombings or
biosabotage) and large-scale accidents (e.g. airplane crashes
or collapsed buildings), disasters not only physically damage
large numbers of individuals, but they also damage or
destroy the medical infrastructure in the region affected
by the disaster. A surgeon without basic imaging/labora-
tory/blood bank, an operating room and support staff is
useless. Not only are medical personnel needed (note that
medical personnel in the disaster zone are not themselves
immune from incapacitation or death from the disaster),
but the medical facilities and infrastructure needed to run
the operating room must also be imported.
Some of the equipment needs for disaster response
include
– operating rooms (including anesthesia, instruments,
sterilization, imaging/laboratory/blood bank)
– electricity (generators)
– food and water
– sanitation and accommodation for both personnel
and patients.
Some of the personnel needs for disaster response
include
– operating room staff (anesthesiologist, surgeon,
nurses, support staff )– infrastructure staff (imaging/laboratory/blood bank)
– supply teams (transporters, likely helicopter in most
situations and logistics)
– social service and rehabilitation (for postoperative
care of patients).
In summary, not only are medical resources such
as hospitals and doctors, and local infrastructure such
as clean water and electricity, likely to be unavailable
in a major disaster but the access routes for supplies
(notably highways, railways and airports) are likely
to be destroyed or unserviceable as well. One must
be able to import all necessary resources, usually by
helicopter.
Immediate response to medical emergencies has typic-
ally been the province of the military in most countries.
In the USA, the US Army has developed the mobile
emergency unit (MEU), a cargo container that—in various
configurations—can serve as a self-contained operating
room, recovery room and patient ward. Combined MEUs
make up a combat support hospital, which parallels the
civilian need for immediate medical resources in a disas-
ter. The MEUs can be transported by helicopter (Figure 3).
Other civilian non-governmental organizations such as
the International Medical Corps (IMC) have similar
self-contained transportable operating room facilities
for disaster response.
The recent technological advances in portable medical
equipment to support disaster response are impressive.
Available presently are lightweight devices for the trans-
port of liquid oxygen and its conversion to gaseous oxygen
for patient use (Figure 4a), mass oxygen distribution sys-
tems for providing oxygen for up to 150 casualty patients
simultaneously (Figure 4b) and liquid oxygen generators
for use in harsh remote environments (Figure 4c). For
patient monitoring and cardiac defibrillation, small,
lightweight devices are available that—in addition to
defibrillation—can simultaneously monitor a 12-lead elec-
trocardiogram, noninvasive blood pressure, end-tidal CO2,
oxygen saturation, two temperature channels and three
invasive pressures—with a 6-h battery life.
Computerized tomography (CT) scanning is crucial in
the evaluation and treatment of trauma patients. A 400-kg
portable head CT scanner (CereTom®) has been developed
by NeuroLogica Corporation (Danvers, MA, USA, see
Figure 5a). The CereTom CT scanner has all basic capabil-
ities (contrast CT, CT angiography and xenon perfusion
CT), can be easily moved on rollers by one person and can
be powered by a 12-V car battery using an inverter. A larger
but still portable version for body CT scanning (BodyTom®)
is also available. Figure 5b, C illustrate the BodyTom CT
scanner in both operational (Figure 5b) and transport mode
in a containerized imaging room/operating room that
can be airlifted to the disaster site (as shown in Figure 3).
Figure 3 Chinook transport helicopter—payload 12,000 kg; range 1,100 km.
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Corporation, which should result in worldwide availability
and support.
Frequently, the resource that is most difficult to have
immediately at the site of a disaster is the medical/surgical
specialist, such as a trauma surgeon, an orthopaedic sur-
geon or a neurosurgeon. Telesurgery allows the remotely
located medical specialist to be “virtually” present at the
disaster site. Surgical procedures unfamiliar to the “gener-
alist” physician or the “first responder” emergency team at
the disaster site can often be managed if the medical spe-
cialist (e.g. trauma surgeon) can act as a “virtual surgical
assistant”. Vigilent Telesystems (Dorval, QC, Canada),
with the assistance of the Canadian Government, has
created a remote-control camera system for providing
real-time specialist guidance for physicians in remote
clinics in northern Quebec (who may be 1,000 km or
more from the nearest major medical center in Montreal
or Quebec City). The telesystem consists of two remotelyFigure 4 Lightweight devices for the transport of liquid oxygen and i
Oxygen Converter (LOX)—full wt 20 kg—up to 8,600 L of gaseous oxygen
(LOX) Distribution System (MODS)—up to 64,500 L of gaseous oxygen (cou
and Liquifier (OGL)—generates 1 L of LOX per hour; generated LOX can filcontrolled robotic arms, each with a camera, which can be
mounted on the ceiling of either a remote clinic or a
portable operating room (MEU) (Figure 6a, b). A medical
or surgical specialist, perhaps thousands of kilometres
away, is able to control the cameras and interact verbally
with the medical personnel at the disaster site, much as an
attending surgeon might supervise a junior colleague in
training. A portable, briefcase-sized, battery-powered,
remotely controlled camera is being developed to allow
continuous visual (vital sign etc.) monitoring of a trauma
patient from the site of injury when the first responders
arrive on the scene, in the ambulance or helicopter, to the
trauma hospital and the operating room. The remotely
located medical/surgical specialist could thus monitor and
direct the care of a trauma patient from the scene of injury
to definitive in-hospital treatment at either a medical
center or a disaster response MEU. Such a portable
remote monitoring device is functional wherever there
is Internet access.ts conversion to gaseous oxygen for patient use. (a) 10-L Liquid
(courtesy of Essex Industries, St. Louis, MO, USA). (b) Mass Oxygen
rtesy of Essex Industries, St. Louis, MO, USA). (c) Oxygen Generator
l MODS (b) (courtesy of Essex Industries, St. Louis, MO, USA).
Figure 5 Computerized tomography scanning in the evaluation and treatment of trauma patients. (a) Ceretom portable head CT
scanner—can run on car battery with inverter (courtesy of NeuroLogica, Danvers, MA, USA). (b) BodyTom portable CT scanner in operational
mode (portable imaging/operating theatre) (courtesy of NeuroLogica, Danvers, MA, USA). (c) BodyTom portable CT scanner in transport mode
(portable imaging/operating theatre) (courtesy of NeuroLogica, Danvers, MA, USA).
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ram developed with the efficient use of resources in mind is
the Apollo Telemedicine Networking Foundation (ATNF),
which is part of the Apollo Healthcare System in India.
The ATNF president, Krishnan Ganapathy, is a neuro-
surgeon in Chennai who has spearheaded the develop-
ment of a telemedicine system not only to support
health care throughout India but also to provide tele-
consulting services on a daily basis to other countries in
the region and additionally to over 20 sub-Saharan African
countries [16].
Disaster response—lessons from trauma and stroke centers
Decades ago, it was documented that prompt medical/
surgical treatment for both trauma and stroke victims
resulted in improved outcomes. Thus having hospitals and
medical centers with 24/7 availability of the personnel
needed to treat trauma and stroke victims (either in-house
or on-call for immediate response) became the norm in
developed countries. Recent reports confirm the advan-
tage of trauma and stroke centers for patient outcomes.
Regarding trauma centers, a recent study considered over
6,000 severely injured motor vehicle accident victims who
were initially taken either to a trauma center or to a non-
trauma center (and transferred to a trauma center with
24 h for more definitive care) [17]. Nearly half of the vic-
tims (45%) were taken directly to a trauma center, and
more than half of those taken initially to a non-trauma
center were transferred to a trauma center within 24 h
(57% of the non-trauma center patients). Those patients
who were initially triaged to a non-trauma center had a
30% increase in mortality at 48 h after injury than those
who were initially triaged to a trauma center. Regarding
stroke centers, a study of all patients in Finland who suf-
fered an ischemic stroke 1999–2006 (more than 60,000
patients) considered whether the patient was treated in a
general hospital or in a stroke center (primary orcomprehensive) [18]. The case-fatality rate by 1 year for
patients treated in a stroke center was less than 18%, while
for those treated in a general hospital, it was over 27%; the
percentage of patients treated in a stroke center who were
home at 1 year was over 73%, while for those treated in a
general hospital, it was less than 60%.
What can be learned from the trauma and stroke
center systems to improve disaster response? The key to
the success of the trauma/stroke center model is that it
is fully integrated into the ongoing healthcare system. A
trauma or stroke patient is treated in a manner identical
to any other patient requiring medical care; there is no
separate or parallel delivery system for trauma/stroke
care. From medical student education to the rehabilitation
phase of patient care, the treatment of trauma/stroke
patients—and the trauma/stroke center concept—has
been completely integrated into the ongoing healthcare
delivery and education system. There is no separate
administration or bureaucracy whose approval must be
sought before treating a trauma or stroke patient. Clearly,
if there were such a separate bureaucracy or authorization
process, the resulting delays in care delivery would render
useless any potential advantages of having the trauma/
stroke medical personnel in place.
Disaster response—creating opportunity from unpredictable,
unpreventable and impersonal medicine
There are other significant advantages to integrating dis-
aster response into the ongoing healthcare delivery and
educations system—beyond the immediate response ne-
cessary to achieve improved morbidity and mortality in
disaster situations. One of the major goals of many inter-
national medical/surgical organizations—organizations
often composed of the individual national or regional
medical/surgical societies—is the standardization of med-
ical/surgical education and training across nations, as well
as the standardization of certification of trainees for
Figure 6 Remote-control camera system for providing real-time specialist guidance for physicians in remote clinics. (a) Top—overview of two
ceiling-mounted remote-control cameras in emergency room. Bottom left—closeup of mobile arm+ camera. Bottom right—closeup of mobile camera.
(courtesy of Vigilent Telesystems, Dorval, QC, Canada). (b) Schematic of emergency room and remote trauma surgeon for “telesurgery” (courtesy of Vigilent
Telesystems, Dorval, QC, Canada). (c) Photo of portable, handheld remote-control camera system (courtesy of Vigilent Telesystems, Dorval, QC, Canada).
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cialty intimately involved in disaster response and will
be considered here with regard to benefits beyond im-
proved patient outcomes in disasters. However, the points
made below apply to other specialties ranging from emer-
gency medicine to anesthesiology to trauma surgery to or-
thopaedics, etc.
The primary global neurosurgical organization is the
World Federation of Neurosurgical Societies (WFNS),
which consists of five continental neurosurgical associa-
tions, e.g. the European Association of Neurosurgical Soci-
eties (EANS), 114 national neurosurgical societies and five
affiliate societies, in total involving 30,000 neurosurgeons
worldwide. To quote from the WFNS website [19]:“The WFNS aspires to promote global improvement
in neurosurgical care. The mission of the WFNS is to
work together with our member societies to improve
worldwide neurosurgical care, training and research to
benefit our patients. …The purpose of this Federation
shall be the advancement of neurological surgery in
all of its aspects by…promoting, implementing and
improving minimum and higher standards of
neurosurgical care and training worldwide.”
To date, neurosurgical training and certification for
practice as a neurosurgeon has taken place at the country
level. An exception to this has been the creation by the
WFNS of 19 regional international training centers such
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young African neurosurgeons in Rabat, Morocco, that
began in 2002.
The EANS has taken the lead in unifying neurosurgical
education, training and certification by offering courses
that provide continuing medical education throughout the
European Union as well as written and oral certification
examinations (similar to the US board certification pro-
cess) that are also recognized throughout the European
Union. Individual neurosurgical training programs any-
where in the European Union can apply to become an
EANS-accredited neurosurgical training program. A glo-
bal disaster response system would address one of the pri-
mary purposes of worldwide medical/surgical societies
such as the WFNS—the establishment of universal high-
standard medical/surgical training.
The advantages of such a global disaster response system
for the goals of multinational medical/surgical organiza-
tions such as the WFNS and EANS include
1. Global standards for medical education and training
2. Global standards for medical certification of
competency and licensure
3. The exchange of in-training (residents/registrars)
and senior physicians/surgeons that becomes
possible with global standards
4. The camaraderie amongst physicians/surgeons
worldwide that results from such personnel exchanges
5. The benefits on medical/surgical demography
worldwide that result from such personnel exchanges
6. The world-class research opportunities that result
from global disaster response—a platform for a
global approach to understanding medical/surgical
problems ranging from trauma to post-disaster
infections and psychological disorders
Disaster response—implementing and integrating the DRC
into ongoing health care
We have seen that the trauma/stroke center model of
integration into the ongoing healthcare delivery and
education structure can result in improved patient out-
comes in local (and national) trauma/stroke events.
“Immediate” is one key word in these programs that re-
quire timely response—the equipment and personnel
must be ready on a moment’s notice “24/7” to provide
care. “Integration” is the other key word in the success
of these programs that require timely response—not a
response conditional on administrative authorizations
by even one agency (let alone the multitude of agencies
even in a single country) that are required for a disaster
response at present. Eliminating the administrative
“middleman” (actually “middlemen”, “middle persons”
or “middle bureaucracy” is more accurate) in trauma/
stroke centers has saved countless lives over the pastseveral decades. The time has come to apply this model
to disaster response—which requires a multinational/
regional (and ideally global) integration of the immediate
response seen in trauma/stroke centers.
How can such a global disaster response program be
initiated? To be effective, a disaster response center
(DRC) must be located within a reasonable distance/
time from any potential disaster site. Practically speaking
for helicopter transport of the portable operating room
and other resources, this means within roughly
2,000 km (the range of a transport helicopter with one
refuelling stop—in effect about 10 h transport time).
This would allow an operating room to be functional at
a disaster site within 24 h of a disaster, although with an
increasing number of DRCs and improvements—with
practice—in the time necessary to set up the operating
room and other resources at the disaster site, the time
from notification to medical/surgical support should be
decreased to 12 h or less.
To be within 2,000 km of most of the world’s population
(in regions whose health care can be considered less than
“developed”), one would need at least four DRC sites:
centrally located in both (1) South America and (2) Africa,
as well as (3) Central Asia and (4) Southeast Asia. Two of
these regions have advocates who are willing to spearhead
an effort to establish their respective DRCs:
1. In Iquique (Northern Chile), the medical center has
the support of Leonidas Quintana and his
involvement with the Chilean Ministry of Health.
Iquique is quite well situated to provide timely
disaster response for most of South America.
2. In Peshawar (Northwest Pakistan), Tariq Khan has a
particular background and interest in neurotrauma
(he has been active in the WFNS Neurotraumatology
Committee), has had a well-equipped hospital built in
Peshawar and also has involvement with the Pakistani
Ministry of Health (including the development of a
Trauma Registry for Pakistan). Peshawar is quite well
situated to provide timely disaster response for most
of Central Asia.
Some of the issues to be addressed for establishing a
DRC:
1. Staffing: Ideally, the DRC medical staff (physicians,
nurses) is composed of both in-country and
out-of-country (likely mostly developed country)
staff. Various organizations can provide volunteer
physicians from all specialties to staff a DRC, for
example, the International Medical Volunteers
Association (IMVA), the Health Volunteers Overseas
(HVO—US-based), Operation Giving Back
(OGB—for surgeons, affiliated with the American
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International Education in Neurological Surgery
(FIENS—for neurosurgeons). For continuity, it may
be desirable to emulate the FIENS “Twinning”
program—where a university medical center in a
developed country partners with a medical center in
a developing country for the purpose of providing
experienced healthcare personnel as mentors and
colleagues over an extended period of time. Another
ideal aspect would be for in-training physicians
(residents/registrars) from developed countries to
receive training at a DRC (for 3 to 12 months),
which in a “twinning” situation could involve
residents/registrars from the developing country
DRC spending an equivalent period at the partner
developed country medical center.
2. Licensure and certification: As noted above, within
the global neurosurgical community, the EANS has
taken the lead in cross-border standardization of
licensure and certification in the European Union.
A similar worldwide standard for licensure could be
implemented for disaster response. Note that such
licensure/certification would not be an unrestricted
permanent (or renewable) licence to practice
medicine in another country—but only a licence to
practice during the period of disaster response (and
the period when the physician or nurse is in another
country for training purposes, e.g. as a volunteer at
the DRC).
3. Equipment/devices/drugs/supplies: There are
long-term benefits for the companies that support
DRCs, from pharmaceutical companies to medical
device and equipment manufacturers. Markets for
medical equipment and drugs are approaching
saturation in developed countries; the ability of a
DRC to “fast forward” the development of the
healthcare “market” in a developing region will not
be overlooked by these companies. Because of the
public relations benefits of humanitarian support
of a DRC, companies will be eager to donate
equipment, devices, drugs and supplies to the
DRC, particularly in the initial stages. The favorable
tax consequences of such humanitarian medical
donations are very persuasive as well.
4. Funding: The out-of-country healthcare personnel
(physicians, nurses etc.) would be volunteers, and
much of the equipment/devices/drugs/supplies
initially provided on a humanitarian basis by
medical companies shrewd enough to realize the
huge healthcare growth potential in a developing
country/region with a DRC. Support would
gradually—after, say, the first 2 years—fall
increasingly on the host country healthcare system,
as the benefits of the DRC for the health of thepopulation in the DRC’s “catchment area” became
obvious. Oversight by the involved organizations
would establish the milestones for transition to a
self-sustaining DRC.
5. Administrative approval or sanction: Once the
various organizations agreed on the format and
timeline for the implementation of the DRC concept
(appropriate branches of the UN and WHO, host
country and regional health ministries, international
NGOs, international medical volunteer societies and
physician/nursing organizations etc.), there would be
significant “pressure” on local healthcare authorities
to participate productively in the DRC. Although the
local healthcare personnel may initially resent the
intrusion represented by a DRC integrated into their
medical center, the DRC represents a “win-win” for
all parties involved. Soliciting local input on the
particulars of the DRC in a given locale can be
productive from the standpoints of both cost (more
economical implementation) and politics (less local
resistance to a new program). The benefits of
learning efficient healthcare delivery from
developing countries (versus assuming the developed
countries have knowledge of all the best healthcare
policies) have been catalogued by Nigel Crisp (who
headed the National Health Service in the UK from
2001 to 2006) [20]. An ongoing, worldwide
healthcare project such as the disaster response
DRC should not represent a threat to even the most
reclusive government. The devastating consequences
of Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2008 can be
avoided everywhere in the world if disaster response
is understood as a global humanitarian effort and
not a potential espionage or subversive “photo-op”.
Conclusions
Disaster response—benefits of predictable, preventable
and personalized disaster medicine
We conclude by summarizing the unique aspects and
unique benefits of the disaster response center.
Unique aspects:
1. Like trauma and stroke centers, the DRC is
completely integrated into the ongoing healthcare
system. The response to a disaster is identical to the
response presently in a trauma center when an
injured patient is identified or in a stroke center
when a stroke patient is identified: the resources and
personnel are immediately available to respond to
the medical need—without any administrative
approvals.
2. The DRC equipment and personnel, being completely
integrated into the ongoing healthcare system, serve
to augment the local healthcare resources during the
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cost-effective, especially given the equipment and
personnel that will be forthcoming to create such a
valuable healthcare resource for the entire region in
the time of disaster and more locally for the other
times. This parallels the trauma/stroke center model
—where patients in urgent need of the specialized
equipment and personnel of the trauma/stroke center
are triaged there immediately, while patients with
other less intensive medical problems are cared for in
centers without such resources.
3. The humanitarian aspect of disaster response will
make approaching governments for regional to global
cooperation feasible. It will also make donations or
discounts of drugs, devices, equipment and supplies
from manufacturers more practical. Medical volunteer
organizations will have the opportunity to staff
simultaneously both ongoing health care in
underserved regions as well as disaster response.
4. Telemedicine/telesurgery is an integral part of the
DRC concept; the diffusion of telemedicine/
telesurgery throughout the world would advance
rapidly in support of the DRC mission (during both
disaster response and daily healthcare delivery).
Unique benefits:
1. The loss of life including patients with survivable
injuries who die from delay of medical/surgical
treatment that is routinely experienced today during
and immediately following disasters both natural and
man-made would be significantly decreased.
2. Daily health care in regions around a DRC would
improve dramatically from the infusion of healthcare
resources that comes with the DRC.
3. The level of healthcare delivery and medical
education would improve in developing countries as
they partner with healthcare delivery and medical
education in developed countries to staff the DRC.
Medical knowledge would flow the other way also,
as the healthcare personnel from the developed
countries learn techniques regarding efficient and
effective healthcare delivery and medical education
from their local counterparts [20].
4. Medical education and training, and licensure and
certification, would all tend toward a global
standard given the cross-border aspects of disaster
response and the DRC. International healthcare
agencies such as the WHO would assist inter-
national medical
societies (e.g. for neurosurgery, the WFNS) develop
uniform worldwide training and certification
standards, using input from member specialists in
both developed and developing countries.5. Regional and global cooperation on disaster response
amongst governments that might not be able to
agree on many other issues can have, over time,
profound effects on breaking down barrier in related
areas such as general education (e.g. regional/global
standards for high school and university diplomas)
and trade (e.g. multinational companies whose
products extend beyond health care narrowly
defined, such as Johnson & Johnson, Siemens,
General Electric, Samsung).
6. The long-term positive effects of camaraderie amongst
healthcare professionals from both developed and
developing countries working together on a daily
basis—especially the junior and in-training personnel
who are likely to benefit most from experiencing
different social, political and religious points of
view—are difficult to overestimate.
7. The DRC will be an unparalleled global research
platform to study not only trauma but also related
issues ranging from infection and sanitation to
rehabilitation and post-traumatic stress.
We conclude with the observation, noted at the outset,
by the UN World Conference on Disaster Reduction a
decade ago [5]:
“We have the knowledge for disaster reduction, what
we need is the action. The most important condition
for disaster reduction is the political commitment to
remove the institutional barriers and integrate disaster
risk reduction in the strategies and programmes for
sustainable development…”
Unpredictable, unpreventable and impersonal disasters—
anywhere in the world—can be leveraged into a predictable
medical response, with preventable consequences on mor-
bidity and mortality and personal benefits far beyond that
reduction in individual morbidity and mortality. Integrating
disaster response seamlessly into the healthcare training
and delivery system worldwide will have socioeconomic
effects far beyond the individual lives saved—institutional
barriers to universal health care, education and global
development will erode in the face of the humanitarian
benefits for everyone. The lack of political commitment is
not an option—we can no longer afford not to act.Competing interests
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